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 Military interventions in political affairs have hinder the process of democratization 
within countries like Pakistan. This single case study of Pakistan discusses why the military in-
tervened into domestic affairs by discussing political, economic and social conditions within Pa-
kistan after partition from India. This study shows that heavy reliance on the military post- parti-
tion decreased civilian authority and increased military supremacy. Moreover, this study also 
shows the shift from direct to indirect military intervention within Pakistan and concludes that 
the military will continue to influence political affairs indirectly if the elected civilian govern-
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Introduction 
 Why does the Pakistani military influence politics under democratically elected civilian 
governments? The aim of this thesis is to study civil-military relationships in the current era by 
answering the above question in the context of Pakistan. Although prominent scholars such as 
Samuel Huntington, Michael Desch and others have engaged in research explaining how to pre-
vent military influence into political and policy making processes; the scholarship has not ex-
plained why the military still tends to do so. Despite the fact that direct military interventions 
into political affairs or coups are now very rare, the indirect influence of the military still exists, 
and it can overshadow and control the decisions of democratically elected political leaders. 
Therefore, a deeper investigative quest of political affairs of Pakistan is necessary because Paki-
stan, despite having a civilian democratically elected government, remains under extreme influ-
ence of military leadership. What events or situations led to such control? What actions have 
been taken by the civilian government to limit this interference? The answer to these questions 
will assist into addressing the main question of this study. As a result, the following section will 
present a brief history of Pakistan after India’s partition because it helps to understand the steps 
towards military supremacy rather than development of a democratic state.  
Beginning of a New State: Pakistan 1947  
 After partition of India in 1947, Pakistan was divided into West and East Pakistan. Paki-
stan emerged as a newly independent state aimed to develop democratic institutions within the 
country; however, failed to do so for many reasons. Firstly, the founding fathers of Pakistan 
aimed to put together a Constitution by establishing a Constituent Assembly. Apparently, the 
Constituent Assembly was established, designated with the task of drafting a democratic consti-
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tution but in practice there was a concentration of power by Jinnah. According to Philip Olden-
burg (2010), Jinnah as the first Governor General, concentrated all executive, legislative and po-
litical positions, reducing the powers of prime minister and increasing the authority of bureau-
cracy and military.  In addition, Jinnah also rejected the formation of political parties due to the 
fear that “they will destroy and capture what the Muslim League has achieved” a view which 
was later adopted by Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister that served along Jinnah, who 
claimed that “those who formed parties are traitors, liars and hypocrites” (Allen McGrath,1996). 
In addition to the concentration of power, the early deaths of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan also 
impacted the process of transition towards democracy. After the death of Jinnah and the assassi-
nation of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad came to power and 
dismissed the Constituent Assembly, which strengthened the alliance between the military and 
bureaucracy and strengthened military supremacy.  
 Along with the concentration of power and early deaths, the ethnic divide hindered the 
shift towards democratic norms. As mentioned above, Pakistan was divided into West and East 
Pakistan. East Pakistan consisted of Bengali speaking population, while West Pakistan consisted 
of Urdu speaking elite. East Pakistan was constantly pushed to the side lines post-partition by 
early political leaders. For example, Jinnah announced the national language of Pakistan to be 
Urdu, while majority of Pakistan’s population consisted of Bengali’s and non-Bengalis within 
the nation. The Bengali population lacked representation within the military and political institu-
tions, concentration of power within the hands of elite officials in West Pakistan as well as in-
creasing tensions between West Pakistan elite and Bengali majority in East Pakistan. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that post-independence West Pakistan’s elite did not strive to construct a con-
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stitution for the country (Ahsan, 2005). Ahsan (2005) claims that constitution would have “en-
tailed for fresh mandate through free and fair general elections,” and the elite did not want to 
lose its power to East Pakistan. Urdu and Punjab speaking elites feared the majority Bengali 
speakers in East Pakistan. As a result, East Pakistan gained independence from West Pakistan in 
1971 and became the state of Bangladesh. This loss of East Pakistan enabled democratic elec-
tions which enabled Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to come to power. From this brief history, it is evident 
that lack of democratic institutions due to early deaths, lack of commitment to construct a consti-
tution and ethnic divide enabled the military to leave its field of national security into in the field 
of politics.  
Why military intervention?  
 Samuel Finer (1962) arguing that political culture sets the parameters for military inter-
ventions, says that a society that lacks effective political culture will leave the military establish-
ments or institutions as the only body to govern. Political culture can be defined as underlying 
rules that determines the success and failure of political system. Finer argues that there are four 
levels of military interventions that are connected to the six modes of intervention which are “1) 
the normal constitutional channel, 2) collusion and competition with civilian authority, 3) intimi-
dation of civil authority, 4) threats of non-cooperation with civilian authority, 5) lack of defer-
ence for civilian authority during violence, and 6) violence against civilian authority” (Finer, 
1962).The order of political culture, level of interventions, mode of intervention are intercon-
nected and  based on the society which can lead to a civilian, indirect limited, indirect complete, 
dual, direct military or direct, quasi-civilianized regime type. By studying various countries 
based on the conditions of political culture, Finer concludes that military interventions are an is-
sue of countries that lack political institutions and culture. In other words, countries that are new 
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states will have complications in consolidating a full-fledged democracy because it has not de-
veloped political institutions or culture.  
 Harold Trinkunas (2010) agrees with Finer that not having a supportive political culture 
will make newly emerging democracies vulnerable to military intervention. Trinkunas claims 
that when a country transitions toward democracy, the civilian authority must “craft” institutions 
that will shift power from the military towards civilian institutions by limiting the access of mili-
tary to areas of state policy in which it plays a dominant role. In order to limit the access of mili-
tary, it is essential to separate between the activities that civilian and military participates in, and 
also take into consideration the agency which “orders and oversees the activities.” Having unsta-
ble and weak political institutions that ensure civilian supremacy will lead the military to inter-
vene into political affairs. Through these political institutions, civilian leaders are able to moni-
tor, “divide and conquer” and sanction to ensure civilian supervision over the military and re-
strict the military’s role in interfering in political matters.  
 In addition to the lack of political institutions, the military also intervenes into politics 
when elected officials cut military spending and try to shift power away from the military to-
wards themselves. Majeed (2010) notes that there is an increase in military expenditures when 
the military takes over. The military is provided with new facilities, new hardware is ordered and 
there is an increase in salaries. Moreover, whenever the civilian leader attempts to reduce the 
power of the military, for example in the areas of national security and foreign policy, the mili-
tary tends to create indirect domestic instability. Ghoshal's (2009) study shows that there is a 
changing pattern in the military interference in politics. Ghoshal refers to this pattern as the 
“power without responsibility and accountability” and argues that the military does not directly 
come to power anymore; yet, the military controls the Establishment secretly and destabilizes 
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elected leaders. Ghoshal asserts that this pattern emerges when elected leaders push to take con-
trol over institutions once dominated by the military.  
Hypothesis  
 Based on the brief history and literature review, it is evident that post partition the lack of 
political leadership and constitution, internal instability and external threat, and heavy reliance 
upon the military enabled the military to engage and become comfortable in politics. Lack of po-
litical culture and inability to craft institutions that secured civilian control allowed the military 
to become powerful. Moreover, even if the military allows elected leaders to come to office; it 
overshadows the decision-making process. This overshadowing does not allow political leaders 
to secure their power by diminishing the power of military. Therefore, I argue that if a democrat-
ically elected leader comes to power in Pakistan and tries to increase the control and power of 
civilian leadership by challenging the influence of military establishment, then the military will 
use its “power without responsibility and accountability” to decrease the power of civilian lead-
ership by removing them out of office.   
Methodology  
 This study uses the qualitative research method which consists of process tracing and a 
single case study. Process tracing method or opening the “black box” focuses on related events 
of an incident to identify the factors to which decision makers respond. When studying civil mili-
tary relations in Pakistan, process tracing is a useful method as it focuses on history which helps 
in determining what comes first, conditioning what comes later. In simple words, in this study, 
process tracing will enable focusing on events and procedures that allowed the military to engage 
in the sphere of politics and how over time the military became a strong institution within Paki-
stan. This study will only engage in a single in-depth case study. According to Bent Flyvberg 
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(2004) and Yanow el at. (2008), a “case study” is defined as a detailed examination of single 
phenomenon to develop knowledge of processes, make causal inferences, test hypothesis, build 
and test theories. These theories will assist in proving the hypothesis of the study.  
Overview of Chapters 
 The primary concern of this thesis is to understand why the Pakistani military still has in-
fluence over elected political leaders. As a result, each chapter of this study will focus upon the 
martial law leaders and democratic leaders since 1958. Chapter 1 will focus upon the martial law 
of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, the events that led to their rise, the political and economic con-
ditions in Pakistan under their rule and finally the collapse of their regime. Chapter 2 discusses 
the democratic government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the changes made to military establishment as 
well as political and economic reforms introduced and the reasons to Bhutto’s collapse and fail-
ure to maintain democratic institutions within Pakistan. Chapter 3 is regarding the regime of Zia 
ul Haq and the 11 years of his governance. Finally, Chapter 4 stresses upon the era of Perverz 











Ayub Khan Era  
 Ayub Khan becoming the Chief Marital Law Administrator was not surprising news, but 
a well known fact by civilians domestically. During the era of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, 
he was appointed as the commander of chief in hopes to reduce the tensions between India and 
Pakistan regarding the issue of Kashmir.  The tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, 
dates back to partition when it was decided that “contiguous Muslim majority areas would go to 
Pakistan.”1 However, India conspired and secured the accession of Kashmir to India. Pakistan 
protested and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru assured Liaquat Ali Khan that the people 
of Kashmir will decide their own fate of joining India or Pakistan. According to Ziring (1971) 
India and Pakistan were reluctant to reach an agreement on the issue of Kashmir and hence con-
tinued with the blame games, while Liaquat Ali Khan was in favor of establishing peace talks 
with India and willing to agree upon seize fire against India. 
This push for peace talks with India resulted in a conspiracy by high ranking Pakistani 
officers to remove Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and resume war with Kashmir. During this 
period, Ayub Khan was trying to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan as well as keep the 
officers from attempting to topple the civilian government. In 1951 the military coup also known 
as the “Rawalpindi Conspiracy” was unsuccessful resulting to the imprisonment of high military 
commanders, journalists and poets. Yet, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated dur-
ing the public meeting in Rawalpindi in 1951.2 The death of Liaquat Ali Khan was followed by a 
                                                 
1“The Foreign Policy of Liaquat Ali Khan.” Retrieved from: 
https://www.dawn.com/news/881096 (2010) 
2 Dryland, Estelle. “Faiz Ahmed Faiz and the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case”. Journal of South 
Asian Literature 27(2), 1992, pp. 175-185  
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series of political appointments “which could be seen in retrospect to have spelled administrative 
disaster for Pakistan” (Dryland, 1992). From 1951 to 1958 an Urdu speaking Bengali, Khwaja 
Nazimuddin, served in office who was later dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad 
in 1958 and replaced by East Begali Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra who assumed office 
from 1953-1955. In the year 1954 Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the First 
Constituent Assembly, while the political party Muslim League “suffered almost total defeat in 
East Bengal that year retaining a mere two seats” (Dryland, 1992). As a result, the Second Con-
stituent Assembly was assembled which consisted mostly West Pakistani Muslim League mem-
bers. In addition to dominance by West Pakistani political leadership in Constituent Assembly, in 
1955, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra was replaced by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali a civil 
service servant in West Pakistan. Furthermore, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad was also 
replaced by President Iskander Mirza, after making a proposal to Ayub Khan to impose martial 
law.  
 According to Dryland (1992) “during the period 1950-1958, Pakistan appointed seven 
prime ministers and one commander in chief, a record which may be attributable to the political 
immaturity of Pakistan’s political aspirants.” In addition to the continuous changes in govern-
ance, Hasan Rizvi (2013) notes that there was continuous infighting and unrest between the po-
litical leadership and government that were formed under the parliamentary system. For exam-
ple, in March 1958 the Chief Minister Ataur Rehman Khan, of East Pakistan, failed to get his 
budget plan passed in the provincial assembly and had his ministry dismissed by Governor Gen-
eral Fazalul Haq in 1958. Approaching the Prime Minister, Feroze Khan Noon, Rehman asked 
for the removal of Fazalul Haq. After the removal of Haq, the position of Acting Governor was 
replaced by a civil servant. The Acting Governor dismissed the ministry of Abu Hussain Sarkar, 
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the leader of Krishak Sramik Party. Within two days “one governor and two Chief Ministers had 
been dismissed.” In addition the Deputy Speaker of East Pakistan Assembly also passed away 
pushing for the governance by the army. It can be argued that the continuous shift of power and 
political restlessness as well as heavy reliance on the military to address internal and external sit-
uations led to military supremacy. For example, apart from dealing with the Rawalpindi Conspir-
acy of 1951, Ayub Khan was also relied upon to rebuild the Pakistani Army and restore order 
during the riots and lawlessness in East Pakistan in the years 1953, 1954, 1956, and 1958 (Ziring, 
1971).  Ayub Khan also restored order during the “persistent clashes with the tribal and paramili-
tary forces on the North West Frontier” (Ziring, 1971). Apart from political affairs, lack of eco-
nomic efficiency also led to martial law in 1958.  
 In 1958, Pakistan was in grip of economic crisis, “facing scarcity of consumer of goods, 
rising prices, shortage of food, financial indiscipline and large-scale deficit financing by the gov-
ernment ” (Rizvi 2013).Moreover, the government Treasury was empty and foreign exchange 
reserves were down. The First Five Year plan was not passed until the year 1958. The economic 
life of Pakistan was based on smuggling, black marketing and hoarding. According to political 
analysts, main reason why Ayub Khan initiated martial law was because of the security threats 
from neighboring country India. Ayub Khan claimed that internal unrest will make the country 
vulnerable and weak to deal with external threats, as a result the army needed to be in power.  
Based on the historical events mentioned above, it can be stated that the military came to power 
because of 1) lack of effective political leadership, 2) the heavy reliance on the military to ad-
dress internal as well as external threats and 3) the downfall of the economy. It can be argued 
that if the military can successfully establish law and order as well as maintain economic growth, 
then democratic institutions and norms are not necessary as the support for the military increases 
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within the population. Therefore, the next section will focus on political and economic affairs un-
der Ayub Khan.  
Politics and Economics Under Ayub Khan  
 Ayub Khan served office for 11 years from 1958 to 1969.  Ayub Khan left the military 
position and became the President of Pakistan under the new constitution of 1962. Under Ayub 
Khan the military had to established an alliance with the bureaucracy to govern the country. For 
example, the President’s cabinet which was reappointed consisted of three Lieutenant Generals, 
public servants, a businessman, an educationist, diplomat and two lawyers.  Ayub Khan also ap-
pointed the Secretary General as the Deputy Chief Martial Law administrator. The Chief Martial 
Law administrator was assisted by an advisory council which consisted of secretary-general, 
government of Pakistan, as well as the central secretaries of finance, industries, commerce, eco-
nomic affairs and works, irrigation and power. Moreover, Pakistan was divided into three zones, 
A, B, and C as well as sub-zone with each having assigned martial law administrator and sub-
marital law administrator. Main institutions such as the Supreme Courts, High Courts and the 
lower courts were allowed to function, yet lacked the right to question and challenge the deci-
sions made by the marital law or military courts. Moreover, Ayub’s Public Offices Disqualifica-
tion Order and Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order “were used to disqualify politicians from 
elective officer position for several years” (Dobell, 1969). It can be argued that the emergence of 
a strong alliance between the military and bureaucracy led to the concentration of power into the 
hands of few individuals, while the influence of political parties and leaders diminished. Accord-
ing to Hasan Rizvi (2013) Ayub Khan also appointed committees that reported upon different is-
sues. For example, Ayub Khan created a political system known as the Basic Democracies. Ac-
cording to Ayub, the parliamentary democracy system was considered unsuitable for Pakistan 
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and was against direct election by universal adult franchise because “the voters could not resist 
the temptation of bribery: only millionaires would dare contest elections” (Dobell, 1969). There-
fore, in 1962 Ayub Khan introduced the Basic Democracies political system, an indirect elective 
system. This new system also insured place for the army and the military which did not exist un-
der the old system becoming a step towards making the military a stronger and independent insti-
tution.  
 The Basic Democracies consisted of five tiers of institutions. Starting with the lowest, 
this tier was composed of “union councils, one for each groups of villages having an approxi-
mate total population of 10,000” (Rizvi, 2013). The union councils were responsible for the de-
velopment of local agricultural and community, and in charge for the maintenance of the rural 
law and order. Above the union council tier were the subdistrict council that maintained coordi-
nation functions. The next tier consisted of district councils that were chaired by the deputy com-
missioners. Above them were the divisional advisory councils and the highest tier consisted of a 
developmental advisory council for each province. In the 1960 the elected members of the union 
council voted Ayub Khan as the president and under the 1962 constitution the union created an 
electoral college by which they elected the president, National Assembly and the provincial as-
semblies. The Basic Democracies system failed and therefore collapsed in the year 1969. The 
Basic Democracies did harm to the Ayub Khan regime rather than any benefit. Ayub Khan also 
eliminated the influence of politicians from politics through the motion of regulations such as 
Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO) and The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Or-
der (EBDO) in 1959. These regulations were applied to all of those politicians that had been en-
gaged in corruption and misconduct.  
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 In addition to political reforms Ayub Khan also introduced and engaged in economic re-
form for prosperity and growth. According to Rizvi (2013) Pakistan’s economic development 
was “based on principle of maximum encouragement to private enterprise through state subsidies 
without regard to the income distribution or other consideration of social justice.” This increased 
the gap between the upper classes and the lower classes and led to unrest between West Pakistan 
and East Pakistan. Rizvi (2013) claims that in 1968 Chief Economics of the Planning Commis-
sion stated that “only twenty families control 66 percent of the entire industrial capital, 80 per-
cent of the banking and 97 percent of insurance capital.” During his ten years of rule, Ayub Khan 
increased the gross fixed investment from 8.5% of GDP in 1958-1959 to 14% in 1968-1969. 
However, the political gains and economic growth under Ayub Khan did not last long after his 
removal from office by military ruler Yahya Khan. It can be argued that lack of consolidation of 
these political and economic changes led to the downfall of Ayub Khan and left a vacuum of in-
effective institutions within Pakistan. Since Pakistan witnessed a brief period of security and 
growth under the military rule of Ayub Khan, the military became an independent powerful insti-
tution and remained credible in the eyes of the public.  
Collapse of Ayub Khan Military Regime  
 In 1968, minor challenges against the military regime of Ayub Khan became major, lead-
ing to the collapse of his government and push for liberal democratic institutions in Pakistan. In 
the previous years Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once an associate of Ayub Khan, created the Pakistan 
People’s Party as a response to differences between Bhutto and Ayub on the issue of Kashmir. 
Bhutto left politics and toured West Pakistan to gain support for his party by accusing the gov-
ernment of lacking efficiency in dealing with issues such as corruption, nepotism, civil admin-
istration and most importantly, freedom for Kashmir. Bhutto’s campaigning increased student 
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demonstrations within Pakistan. Student demonstrations against the Ayub Khan regime took 
place in Rawalpindi which killed a student and increased support for Bhutto and his political 
party. During a conference in 1968, two shots were fired at Ayub Khan. As a result Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto and other political leaders were arrested in charges of engaging in events that place the 
countries security and safety in jeopardy. With the growing pressure of political parties and lead-
ers as well as the signing of Tashkent Declaration and other political crisis, the military also 
stopped supporting Ayub Khan. The military pressured Ayub Khan to resign from all duties and 
decided that the transfer of power was necessary. Therefore, in 1969 despite the demonstrations 
and rise of political parties demanding for democratic elections, the military decided to transfer 
power to Yahya Khan rather than to political leaders. Yahya Khan being aware of the criticism 
on Ayub Khan regime introduced new political and economic policies to secure military domi-
nance.    
President-General Yahya Khan Regime 1969-1971  
 Yahya Khan replaced Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President 
of Pakistan without any opposition in 1969. During the beginning of his regime, Yahya Khan 
followed the footsteps of Ayub Khan as he did not have much political experience. Yahya Khan 
issued a “Provisional Constitution Order” which claimed that until the enforcement of a new 
constitution (created in 1973), Pakistan will be governed under the 1962 constitution. The 1962 
Constitution entrusted President-military leaders such as Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan with all 
political powers including executive, legislative, and financial powers under the Presidential sys-
tem. The National Assembly consisting of 156 members became weaker as compared to the 
powers of the executive (Rizvi, 2013). Similar to Ayub Khan regime the fundamental rights of 
the courts, enlisted in the 1962 Constitution, were suspended and lacked the ability of passing 
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any order against the decisions of Chief Martial Law authority. It can be argued that these re-
strictions upon the executive, legislative and judiciary under the military regimes, strengthened 
and created an unbreakable military dominance and hegemony and dissolved the chances of 
democratic institutions to emerge.  
 Since Yahya Khan did not have political experience, he appointed advisors from Ayub 
Khan administrations in new positions. Yahya Khan only relied on few agents and individuals 
which consisted the Principal Staff and Officer to the President and Chief Martial Law adminis-
trator, and three Deputy Chief Martial Law administrators for the “first few months of Martial 
Law” as decision makers who controlled the central and provincial administrations (Rivzi, 
2013). I argue that the alliance and power within the hands of few military leaders, enabled the 
military to come out of domestic crisis that emerged during Ayub Khan era and became capable 
of keeping all institutions under check. The military leaders also secured power by maintaining 
international support as political parties and politicians were resurfacing and beginning to gain 
public support.  
Changes under Yahya Khan  
 Like Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan also faced internal challenges to his regime. For example, 
in 1969 demonstrations were held by Dacca Students against the martial law regulations. During 
Ayub Khan era a ban was placed on strikes and demonstrations which Yahya Khan reinforced as 
a response to Dacca Students protest. Yahya Khan ordered the arrest of these students, but was 
unsuccessful as the students went underground. The use of force and failure to restore demo-
cratic institutions, despite promises made by Yahya Khan, led the country into a civil war. As a 
result, unlike Ayub Khan who paid less attention to labor problems, Yahya Khan decided to re-
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store the right to collective bargaining, strike, simplified the method of recognition of trade un-
ions, and “reduced the administrator’s powers of prosecuting a union in a court of law in cases of 
default and extended legal protection to the offices bears of a union” (Rizvi, 2013). Moreover, in 
1970 Yahya Khan also implemented the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control 
and Prevention) Ordinance was enforced so that wealth was not concentrated in the hands of few. 
Apart from this, in Dacca a new financial institution known as the Equity Participation Fund was 
established to “supplement the capital resources of small and medium sized enterprises in the pri-
vate sector in East Pakistan and the less developed areas of West Pakistan” (Rizvi, 2013). In the 
same year, the Fourth Five Year Plan was launched which focused on making distributions of re-
sources and fruits of economic development. However, the plan came under attack in East Paki-
stan as political leaders demanded shortfalls of the Third Five Year Plan to be mended in the new 
plan. Others wanted the new plan to be passed by the new elected government of 1970. 
 Yahya Khan implemented and restored new policies, but also engaged in immense 
cleansing of the administration by enforcing series of martial law regulations that checked for 
“growing nepotism, favourtism and corruption in the civil administration” (Rizvi, 2013). In 1969 
under the Marital Law Regulation number 58 about 303 Class I civil officers were suspended 
due to charges of misuse of office in the past eleven years. Yahya Khan merged the states of 
Chitral, Swat and Dir with West Pakistan creating it into one unit. The one unit consisted of re-
constituting West Pakistan into four provinces of Punjab, Sind, NWFP, and Baluchistan. Yahya 
Khan made promises of holding “free and fair elections” and to fulfill that promise he appointed 
Justice Abdus Sattar the of Judge Supreme Court of Pakistan as the Chief Election Commis-
sioner to prepare “electoral rolls and delimit constituencies” (Rizvi, 2013). Khan issued the Le-
gal Framework Order that “provided the guidelines for the general elections and outlined the 
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principles which the military leaders thought the National Assembly must keep in mind while 
framing the constitution”. Political leaders from West Pakistan started to tour East Pakistan for 
support during elections, however, East Pakistan criticized these political leaders. Individuals in 
East Pakistan accused “West Pakistani political elite and the central government of having un-
sympathetic and callous attitude towards East Pakistan” (Rizvi, 2013).   
 Elections in Pakistan were originally scheduled for October 1970, but were pushed back 
to December 1970 because of the cyclone in East Pakistan. During these elections two parties 
swept the poll, the Awami League of East Pakistan and the Pakistan’s People Party. Election re-
sults were important to Yahya Khan’s regime as they determined whether the elected govern-
ment construct a constitution that would be suitable and accepted by Yahya Khan. Despite the 
elections the political alienation between East and West Pakistan continued to grow. As West Pa-
kistan progressed economically and socially; East Pakistan lacked essential resources for devel-
opment and growth. East Pakistan lacked industry and infrastructure and was continuously ne-
glected by the Yahya Khan administration. As a result, these factors played a vital role in the 
civil war between West and East Pakistan in which support for a separate nation known as Bang-
ladesh was demanded. During this war India also played a vital role in helping liberate East Paki-
stan from West Pakistan, which led to the downfall of the Yahya Khan regime and led to the rise 
of Z.A. Bhutto.   
 When the transition of political power from political leaders to the Pakistani military hap-
pened, it was evident that the military was working to build itself as an independent and domi-
nate institution within Pakistan. To gain support the military passed policies and brought reforms 
that helped the economy to grow. However, it is important to note that these changes were short 
term rather long term. For example, the Basic Democracies system introduced by Ayub Khan, 
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was meant to create a link between the government and the people, however, the system failed 
due lack of communication between officials and corruption within the system. In addition to 
failure of this system, the war of 1965 with India over Jammu and Kashmir and the lack of abil-
ity to resolve student unrest led to the end of Ayub’s regime. As Ayub Khan’s credibility within 
the military decreased, Yahya Khan’s influence within the armed forces increased. In 1969 Ayub 
Khan decided not stand for reelection and Yahya Khan became President and second martial law 
enforcer. Yahya Khan dissolved the 1962 Constitution and the “One Unit” system which united 
ethnically aligned provinces. Yahya was criticized by the “Establishment” as he held the first 
elections based on adult franchise and promised to give East Pakistan more representation. Yet, 
despite the elections East Pakistan was neither represented nor financially supported by West Pa-
kistan leading to war with India. Losing the war with India in 1971 reduced the support for the 











                                                 
3 Paracha, Nadeem. “Smokers’ Corner: Who was Yahya Khan?” Dawn.  
Retrieved from: https://www.dawn.com/news/1321359. (2017). 
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Chapter 2 
The Era of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto  
 The government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto holds significance in the history of Pakistan be-
cause it marks the first free and fair democratic election after two martial law regimes. Since Pa-
kistan was still emerging as a state without democratic institutions, Bhutto’s ascent raised hopes 
for democratic governance. There was a wide range belief that if Zulfikar Ali Bhutto success-
fully restores democracy, then Pakistan will not have to face another martial law administration. 
As a result, this chapter focuses on addressing whether Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was able to strength 
democratic institutions.  How did he come to power? What was the political, economic and inter-
national/external conditions under his governance? Having an understanding of the political, eco-
nomic and international/external affairs is important because this thesis argues that political cul-
ture of Pakistan has always been about internal political conflict and when this political conflict 
is coupled with unstable economy and external regional threats, then elected leaders fail to main-
tain order and power shifts towards the military.  
Who was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto?  
 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto served as the Foreign Minister under the marital law administration 
of Ayub Khan, after the death of Mohammad Ali, elevating him “to one of the three highest of-
fices in the President’s cabinet” (Ziring, 1971). He also occupied posts in ministries of Com-
merce, Industries, Information and Broadcasting, Kashmir Affairs, Natural Resources and Reha-
bilitation, and Works. Under Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto engaged in publicly castigating the 
United States for continuous arms shipments made to India, boasting anti-Americanism feelings 
within the population and shaping of good domestic politics and allowing the Ayub regime to ac-
quire credibility. Many also believed that Ayub Khan would also consider to name Bhutto as his 
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heir. However, difference between Ayub Khan and Bhutto emerged despite the years of service 
the latter did for the former. The disagreement over the Kashmir issue and the signing of Tash-
kent Declaration severed relations between Ayub Khan and Bhutto.  
The Kashmir Issue and the Tashkent Declaration  
 The key to maintaining India-Pakistan relations is the issue of Kashmir. As the Foreign 
Minister, Bhutto was very vocal regarding freedom of Kashmir and claimed that “Kashmir must 
be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning” (Ziring, 1971). In 1947 India and Pakistan en-
gaged in a clash to obtain the control over the territory of Kashmir (part of India) and there was a 
brief war in 1965. During the war of 1965 India launched the first attack, pushing the Pakistani 
military to be removed from continuing its offensive of Kashmir and diverting to Lahore and Si-
alkot. This allowed India to gain full control of Kashmir. Pakistan did not have much military 
might due to lack of sophisticated weapons and the United States (Pakistan’s main ally) decided 
to remain neutral and ordered other countries to not get involved in this war. In 1966 a meeting 
was held in Tashkent which was mediated by Soviet premier Aleksey Kosygin inviting the In-
dian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan to end the war. During this 
meeting Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was also present. The parties agreed to withdraw 
armed forces to resume diplomatic relations and to discuss economic affairs. As the discussions 
between the two parties took place, Bhutto continuously advised President Ayub Khan not to 
sign the Tashkent Declaration if it intended to push for the acceptance of “anything less than an 
agreement for the holding of plebiscite in Kashmir” (Ziring, 1971). With the withering of arms 
support from United States for both, India and Pakistan; India still was receiving arms from the 
Soviet’s creating doubts in the mind of Bhutto. Despite all continuous counseling and disap-
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proval regarding the Tashkent Declaration from Bhutto, Ayub Khan signed the agreement. Ac-
cording to Ziring (1971),“when the President revealed he would sign the Tashkent Declaration 
drafted by the Soviet Union, Bhutto asked that he be permitted to publicly disassociate himself 
from it. He also insisted on resigning from the cabinet…When the President put his signature to 
the Tashkent Declaration the Foreign Minister is reported to have looked on dejectedly.” The 
signing of Tashkent Declaration marked the beginning of difference between Ayub Khan and 
Bhutto.  
The Rise of Z.A Bhutto  
 After resigning as the Foreign Minister for Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto created a po-
litical party of his own known as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 1967. The members of the 
party did not consist of elitist or distant groups as compared to other parties but was diverse con-
sisting of individuals belonging to different classes, cultures and academic backgrounds. Bhutto 
came to power after Yahya Khan faced defeat in the war with India and lost East Pakistan which 
later became known as Bangladesh. Bhutto had political advantages at this time which led the 
PPP to gain a majority in the National Assembly, giving hope to the people that his slogan of 
Roti (bread), Kapra (clothing) and Makan (shelter) and their basic problems will be resolved. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Pakistan also considered Yahya Khan’s taking over of powers 
illegal and unconstitutional. Lastly, the disorder caused by Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan lowered 
the support for and the influence of the military within Pakistan, especially after losing East Pa-
kistan there were large amounts of demonstrations throughout the country.  
Politics Under Bhutto  
 Under Bhutto, the Supreme Courts announced severe punishment to those military gener-
als responsible for the “1971 military debacle” (Rivzi, 2013). Furthermore, changes were made 
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to the administrative set-up of the military high command which consisted of placing the Chief 
of Army Staff, Navy Staff and Air Staff under the command of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
with the President of Pakistan as the Commander of Chief. In addition, the Chiefs of Army, 
Navy and Air were only allowed to serve for three years in a way to prevent the chiefs to develop 
their own force and will allow the promotions of junior officers. There were also numerous other 
changes introduced. For example, the 1973 Constitution focused on the pushing the military to 
its “traditional field” and laid down the roles of the military in the Constitution. Previous Consti-
tutions did not have functions of the military defined, however the 1973 Constitution wanted the 
military to stay out of political affairs.  
 In 1972, the Federal Security Force (FSF) was created which was assigned the objective 
of providing assistance to the civil administration and the police for the maintenance of law and 
order. Once maintaining civilian supremacy, Bhutto mended with the military and stopped the 
impression of his government as anti-military. Under Bhutto’s government more resources were 
allocated towards the military as compared to previous governments. Furthermore, the military 
was called upon by the civil government for the maintenance of law and order seven times under 
the Bhutto administration.  
 The military during the Bhutto era respected civilian supremacy and kept out of politics. 
According to Rizvi, the “General Tikka Khan, Chief of Army Staff stressed professionalism and 
loyalty to the constitution and the civilian authority established thereunder” (Rizvi, 2013). Civil-
military relations came under conflict when a small group of Army and Air force officers re-
sented the governments politics and decided to seize power, but were arrested before the plan 
was launched. During the Bhutto era the military extended invaluable services to the civil gov-
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ernment by assisting in maintenance of law and order, nation-building activities as well as play-
ing an active role in rescue operations. For example, Rizvi (2013) claims that the military con-
structed about 350 miles of roads in Marri and Bugti, marking development in these “neglected 
areas of Baluchistan.” In 1974 the civilian government called upon the Army to assist in check-
ing the smuggling of food grain to India and Afghanistan. Moreover, Bhutto’s administration 
failed to fulfill the promises that were made during elections. He made few infrastructural addi-
tions such as construction of schools and universities, a new health policy, and labor policy, but 
faced heavy criticism from the Right and Left wing. The Right judged his polices to be on the 
basis of orthodox Marxist doctrine while the Left consider his policies as Islamic socialism.  
 In addition to these criticisms, other factors such as Bhutto’s use of martial law regula-
tions limited the Fundamental Rights of many institutions. Moreover, PPP officials misused their 
positions as local administrators by appointing and dismissing people through use of force.  Fur-
thermore, there was also increase in rivalries between political parties and the PPP. One event 
that gave Bhutto administration a great blow was the dismissal of Mengal cabinet in Baluchistan 
in 1973 which did a great deal of damage to the plans of institution building. 
The 2nd Islamic Summit Conference  
 The Islamic Summit of 1974 in Lahore can be considered as the landmark achievement of 
the Bhutto government as it placed Pakistan at the center of the world and ended its isolation 
from the world community.  It was the peak of conflicts between the Arab countries and Israel, 
the Arabs imposing an oil embargo and the wound of losing large territory to India was fresh. As 
a result, Bhutto took advantage of the internal and international events to once again boast the 
image of Pakistan as well as respond to the increasing security threats imposed by India.  There-
fore, in 1974 Pakistan hosted the Lahore Summit to discuss the situations of Middle East in the 
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wake of the Arab Israel War of October 1973 and the oil embargo imposed by the Arabs. The 
Summit was attended by head of states, ministers and dignitaries from Muslim countries. The 
Summit was addressed by Prime Minister Bhutto and the delegates decided to support Jordan, 
Syria, Egypt and Palestine to acquire their land back. Moreover, the Palestine issue was also 
stressed upon and an agreement was made to dissolve relations with countries that had alliance 
with Israel. Most importantly, for “enhancement of Islamic culture, solidarity and education the 
Islamic Solidarity Fund was also established.”4 The Lahore Summit had raised Pakistan’s stature 
in the Muslim world. Moreover, it also made India realize that despite the division of East Paki-
stan; Pakistan did not stand alone and was supported by the wealthiest Muslim countries. Fur-
thermore, the summit had also made it possible to acknowledge the status of Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat, strengthening the cause of Palestine in the United Na-
tions. In addition, the summit also brought “solidarity among the Muslim world and made them 
aware of the worth of their resources especially of oil, that Jerusalem was important to the Mus-
lims and was religiously sacred for the entire Muslim Ummah.”  
  It can be argued that the attempt at oneness of the Muslim countries had imposed a cer-
tain threat to most Western developed countries, causing the goals made at the Lahore Summit to 
remain unfulfilled.  For example, the oil embargo of 1973  that the Arabs had imposed, destabi-
lized the entire global market. Even though the embargo was lifted in 1974, a year later Shah 
Faisal was assassinated by his nephew Prince Faisal bin Musaid who had returned from the 
United States. In the same year, Shaikh Mujib ur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh and who 
was also present at the Lahore Summit was assassinated along with his family by the Bangladesh 
                                                 
4 http://historypak.com/lahore-summit-1974/ 
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military. Moreover, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was murdered in 1981, Palestinian Libera-
tion Organization chairman Yasser Arafat was poisoned in 2004, and Muammar Gaddafi (the last 
of the leaders present at the Lahore Summit) was assassinated in 2011.  
Economy Under Bhutto  
 During the 1960s, the economic conditions were relatively stable as compared to the 
1970s. In the 1960s the economy grew at the average rate of 6.8 percent, while in 1970s the 
growth rate fell significantly low to 4.8 percent. In 1973 the increase of prices of oil by the 
OPEC countries created difficulties for Pakistan because the balance of payments deteriorated 
and the states treasury did not hold much reserve. Bhutto’s economic policies consisted of na-
tionalization of industries which was conducted in two phases. The first phase was when PPP 
came to power and decided to bring the financial and physical capital that was owned by corpo-
rate elites under state control. In 1972 the government initially took over thirty-one industrial 
units which fell under ten categories of basic goods. According to Rizvi (2013), “this measure 
was not as extensive as it appeared to be because these units were confined to capital and inter-
mediate goods producing sectors.” Apart from this, State Bank also passed a credit policy by 
which small landlords, rich peasants and the smaller industrial capitalist were the main benefi-
ciaries. However, Bhutto’s first year in office stabilized the economy due to the devaluation of 
the rupee, but this policy of devaluation was looked down upon because it was argued that the 
private sector will suffer significantly as it will raise external debt obligations.  
  Another severe blow to the credibility of Bhutto’s government was when it backed out 
from nationalizing small industrial unities, resulting a drop in private investment. Furthermore, 
in 1976 Bhutto decided to nationalize flour mills, cotton ginning and rice husking mills which 
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threatened the livelihood of shopkeepers, traders as well as small industrialists and it also re-
sulted in “PPP having to bear serious political costs.” Yet, Bhutto was successful in increasing 
the share of the public sector as compared to the private sector. The government was able to re-
duce the power of the private sector, however, some families were successful in taking advantage 
of nationalization as connections count for everything in Pakistan. The second phase was neither 
committed to corporatism nor socialism (core of the PPP party). According to Rizvi (2013), the 
“managers of state enterprises used incorporation of enterprises, not in terms of fulfillment of so-
cialist’s ideology, but as an instrument through which they could pursue power and prestige.”  
The Downfall of Zulfikar Bhutto  
 It was during the elections of 1977 that Bhutto’s administration ended and a new period 
of marital law emerged. During the 1977 elections it was widely believed that Bhutto would win 
due to the divided opposition. However, the opposition parties created an electoral alliance 
known as the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The PNA pointed out the government’s inabil-
ity to pass effective domestic and foreign policies as well as ensure civil and political liberties. 
With the lifting of restrictions on public meetings the PNA gained more public support. How-
ever, despite much efforts by PNA, the PPP won the elections, pushing PNA to engage in a mass 
movement against Bhutto under the charges of election rigging. The mass movement by PNA 
was for the insurance of holding fresh polls, removal of the Chief Election Commission and for 
the resignation of Prime Minister Bhutto. The 1977 mass movement was widespread as it en-
gulfed urban centers and small towns. The business and trading community that was alienated by 
PPP funded the mass movement, while the closure of shops and businesses also did damage to 
the government. Bhutto in response used the police, the FSF and the army to control the mass 
movement as well as arrested the top leaders of PNA. An attempt to reach negotiations between 
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the two parties a meeting was arranged by a Saudi delegate, but the political parties could not put 
their differences to rest.  
 On April 22, 1977 Bhutto imposed martial law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore and 
called upon the army to restore law and order as well as hold trails. Meetings were held between 
PNA and the army to give briefings of internal and external affairs in which Bhutto himself used 
to take part. The PNA attempted to break the alliance between the government and the military. 
The PNA demanded the removal of martial law and appealed to the Service Chiefs to not support 
Bhutto’s government. The continuous use of the military to control the mass movement and 
against the opposition parties did not just place the military in a bad position, but also the gov-
ernment. Moreover, the deteriorating image of Bhutto also gave a chance to the military to take 
over political affairs once again. Therefore, due to the lack of negotiations between Bhutto and 
PNA, the military assumed power on July 5, 1977 by removing Bhutto from power. The new 
martial law regime of Zia ul Haq also placed Bhutto on trial for the murder of Muhammad Ali 
Kasuri and the high court ruled Bhutto guilty and sentenced him to death in an unprecedented 4-
3 decision. On April 4, 1979, Bhutto was executed.  
 The government of Bhutto had come to power in a crucial time, when Pakistan was re-
covering from the war with India which led to the independence and creation of Bangladesh. 
During this time the Pakistani population was willing to participate in elections that ensured an 
elected political official to come to power, as the military became incapable of resolving issues. 
According to Trinkunas (2010) the beginning process of transitioning towards democracy is cru-
cial as the country’s leader can successfully change and create institutions that can enable shift-
ing of power from the military towards civilian authority. It can be stated that Bhutto was able 
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shift the power away from the military, but his heavy reliance on the military to deal with oppo-
sition parties failed to keep the military out of political arena. The consistent reliance on military 
presented Bhutto to be an unsuitable political leader. Furthermore, the Lahore Summit consisting 
of all Muslim countries during the Arab Embargo was also alarming to countries such as the 
United States and Israel, as their interests were under threat. Scholars like Ayesha Jalal have pre-
viously argued that the alliance between the Pakistani military and the United States has done 
more damage than good to Pakistan as it has dissolved political institutions and have left political 
leaders powerless. In the past, United States providing financial support to the Pakistani military 
has enabled the United States to have influence and presence in the region. It can be stated that 
the ousting of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from office was due to the alliance between the United States 
and the Pakistani military, and Pakistani military with opposition parties. Due to this alliance, 
murder cases against Bhutto were taken to the Supreme Court. In simple words, when Bhutto 
was in power, not only were the interests of Pakistani military under threat, but also of powerful 











Chapter 3  
The Martial Law of Zia Ul Haq  
 The previous chapter focusing on governance under Bhutto demonstrates how the domes-
tic politics as well as international politics and lack of economic growth played a vital role to re-
move Bhutto out of office and in prison for murder charges. It is important to note that Bhutto’s 
governance was a key turning point after two martial law regimes. Bhutto as Prime Minister was 
a symbol of hope for democracy which eventually did not turn into reality after his death and 
with Zia ul Haq declaring martial law. Even though Zia ul Haq promised for the shift of power to 
civilian leaders through fair and free elections, these words remained words and were not placed 
into practice. This chapter focuses on politics, economics and the collapse of Soviet Union that 
took place during the Zia ul Haq and how decisions of Zia ul Haq had an impact till present.  
 In 1977 Zia ul Haq declared martial law, suspended the Constitution of 1973 and became 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Like previous martial laws, the federal and pro-
vincial cabinets as well as the national and provincial assemblies were dissolved. The prime min-
ister and leaders of opposition parties were arrested, while the President of Pakistan was allowed 
to continue as the head of state and the Chief Justice of provincial High courts were given the po-
sition of governors for their provinces. The Military Council was placed with the rights of serv-
ing as the highest decision making body. Like under Ayub, Pakistan was once again divided into 
five martial law zones each governed by a martial law administrator. Upon taking office, Zia ul 
Haq declared that within 90 days democratic rule will be reinforced in Pakistan. However, the 
elections were pushed back as the release of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto brought masses to his demon-
strations, announcing that it will not be an easy win for military backed political parties such as 
the Pakistan National Alliance party (PNA).  
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 On the other hand, Bhutto challenged the military and PNA, pushing the military to open 
cases against Bhutto which included a murder case that Bhutto was announced as co-conspirator 
of. Rizvi notes that the “martial law authorities issued several White Papers spread over 2,771 
pages describing how Bhutto rigged the March 1977 elections, how he and his family under-
mined the governmental institutions and procedures and obtained or extended to others illegal 
favors” (Rizvi, 2013). Bhutto’s murder case was stretched out till 1978 and Bhutto was given 
death sentence by the Supreme Court. The elections were pushed to 1979 and the military made 
changes to the electoral system, but these changes received great amount of criticism from politi-
cal parties. Some political parties also refused to register. As a result, the military decided to hold 
nonparty elections in which PPP members were successful in gaining most seats. In response to 
these results, the military decided to postpone the elections for the second time, claiming that it 
was not a suitable time for elections. In the year 1985 General Zia ul Haq held general elections 
as promised and withdrew martial law. However, despite the elections that brought Prime Minis-
ter Muhammad Khan Junejo to power, Zia ul Haq still had influence over the civilian govern-
ment. In 1988 Zia ul Haq dismissed his hand-picked Prime Minister due to the tensions between 
Zia and Junejo over the Ojhri blast and the Afghanistan issue in which Junejo “stepped out of 
line”(Talbot,1998).  
Politics under Zia ul Haq  
 Zia ul Haq emphasized mostly upon Islamization and did not abrogate the 1973 Constitu-
tion. Zia allowed President Fazal Illahi Chaudhry to remain in office and continue as the head of 
state. However, President Chaudhry resigned in 1978 and Haq became the CMLA.  During the 
beginning of his regime, Zia ul Haq imposed restrictions upon political activities which caused 
political demonstrations against the military regime. For example, Rizvi(2013) argues that “the 
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most vocal critics have been lawyers, journalists and the political parties constituting the Move-
ment for the Restoration of Democracy” was set up in 1981 by the PPP members consisting of 
various other political parties as well. Apart from this, Zia ul Haq also “put forward a proposal 
for a constitutional guarantee that would enable the military to share decision making power with 
the political elite at the national level.” Zia ul Haq also decided to create the National Security 
Council (NSC) which consisted for 11 members provided with the powers of direct role in the 
constitutional and political setup. The members of the NSC were chosen by the President, in this 
case Zia ul Haq, and therefore was dominated mostly by the top military brass giving them the 
ability to veto any political decisions made by political leaders as well as serve as key decision 
makers by imposing state of emergency. The NSC was later abolished. The martial law admin-
istration also appointed military officers to the positions of civil service jobs.  These military  of-
ficers “were assigned to the civil administration and to semi-government and autonomous corpo-
rations” (Rizvi, 2013).These military officers were also given access to elite groups of the Cen-
tral Superior Services.  Military officers were also given positions in the District Management 
Group and the Foreign Service of Pakistan, causing anger among civilians taking competitive ex-
amination for these positions. It is evident that like Ayub and Yahya, Zia ul Haq wanted to keep 
political power within the hands of few military officials. During the Zia ul Haq era the military 
became one of the strongest institution within Pakistan as it gained financial support from the 
United States during the Afghan-Soviet war.  
Zia ul Haq and the Afghanistan War  
 Zia ul Haq is known for playing a vital role during the Afghanistan-Soviet war. Accord-
ing to Talbot (1998) there were many factors that explain as to why Zia engaged in this war and 
scholars have presented this war through different aspects. For example, Talbot (1998) claims 
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that most scholars claim that Zia supported the Afghanistan cause to secure military and eco-
nomic aid from the West, especially the United States. On the other hand, Zia engaged into the 
Afghanistan war due to ideological spectrum to “support the mujahideen as a jihad which might 
eventually spread the Islamic revolution to the Central Asian republics” (Talbot, 1998). Talbot 
(1998) argues that these explanations fail to take into consideration the relations between Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan, and Pakistan and India. The relations between Afghanistan-Pakistan 
were troubled due to the Pushtunistan issue and to decrease the dominance of the India over Pa-
kistan, it was necessary to gain arms support and build alliance with the West. It is important to 
note that Pakistan did not have any “fears of the Soviet invasion” and it did not warrant attention 
as compared to the existing threat from India. Furthermore, Indira Gandhi did not refuse the So-
viet invasion after coming to office. This invasion helped India to secure “the growing Indo-So-
viet trade links and Indian reliance on Soviet weapons,” but also pushed Pakistan to ally with 
United States as India avoided to normalize relations with Pakistan. For example, Talbot (1998) 
claims that in the “autumn of 1981, Zia offered a “no war” pact with India and proposed the es-
tablishment of a nuclear-free zone, but India disagreed and pointed out the hypocrisy of Pakistan 
for purchasing “F-16 fighters, weapons and aid package from the Reagan administration.” Since 
Pakistan was an ally to the United States in war against Soviet’s, Zia ul Haq became unstoppa-
ble. According to Jaffrelot (2000) Zia ul Haq received “$3.2 billion dollars from Washington 
over a period of six years” and he managed to “escape American pressures in favor of a return to 
democracy and the defense of human rights.” Zia ul Haq also engaged in launching nuclear pro-
grams and made a lot of profit from Afghanistan war. Jaffrelot (2000) asserts that “in 1981, mili-




 Zia ul Haq, once in power,  argued that the reason behind partition was to create a nation 
for Muslims who were underrepresented and a minority within India. Zia ul Haq claims that per-
vious political civilian leaders failed to create an Islamic country and enforce Sharia Law. As a 
result, Islamization was one of the goal that Zia ul Haq and has administration aimed to achieve. 
The process of Islamization began in 1979 was a feature of Zia’s regime that became the most 
recognizable. Zia applied the Hanafi interpretations to Islamic law which led to tensions between 
the Shia and Sunni sects within Pakistan. Differences between the Shia and Sunni emerged over 
the issues such as zakat (charity), marriage and divorce, inheritance, wills and punishments. The 
tensions between Shia and Sunni intensified not because of the differences within sects inter-
nally, but also due to the Khomeini revolution in Iran. The Islamization program faced many dif-
ficulties especially due to the zakat policies which was an important step towards Pakistan be-
coming an Islamic welfare society, but instead the money was being directed towards fake zakat 
committees. Furthermore, in 1981 the Ramadan Ordinance was put in place which made “eating, 
drinking, and smoking in public a crime liable to an Rs. 500 fine or two months imprisonment” 
(Talbot,1998). In addition, Talbot (1998) notes that ulama’s also wanted the marital law adminis-
trators to impose a dress code for women and pass a law making men having beards as compul-
sory. The Islamization program also covered areas such as judicial reform, implementation of the 
Islamic Penal Code, economic and educational activity.  
 Beginning with the judiciary in 1981 Zia ul Haq diminished the powers of the judiciary 
through the imposition of the Provisional Constitution Order which “required all judges to take a 
new oath of allegiance” (Talbot, 1998). Before this order, in 1979 the Presidential Order was 
passed by which Shariat benches for four provincial High Courts were established, empowered 
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with the role of striking down law that was unsuitable to Islam. However, due to lack of efficacy 
and performance these Shariat courts were replaced by Federal Shariat Courts, appointing ulama 
as judges, in 1981. The appointing of ulama in courts led to passing of bad laws which weakened 
and gave the judiciary a negative reputation regarding punishments for adultery as well as politi-
cal parties. There were many courts combining the Qazi and the Federal, however, there was 
very little justice. According to Talbot (1998) cases were brought into courts, yet the courts took 
forever to resolve them “because of the number of frivolous petitions and lack of understanding 
of the new Islamic laws.” Most strikingly, Shia’s were not allowed to serve as a judge to the Fed-
eral Shariat Court, “a state of affairs which led the community to refuse to accept any of its judg-
ment” (Talbot, 1998).   
 One of the tasks of the Federal Shariat Court was to make decisions regarding appeals 
made by lower courts according to the Hudood Ordinance of 1979 which issued punishments ac-
cording to the Quran and the Sunnah. Crimes that were subject to the Islamic Penal Code con-
sisted murder, adultery, perjury and intoxication and the punishments for these crimes were se-
vere, but “strict Islamic rules of evidence were required, which greatly reduced the likelihood of 
conviction” (Talbot, 1998). Yet, punishment for theft led to many uprisings of human rights ac-
tivists and doctors as it involved the amputation of the hands of the criminals, violating the rights 
of individuals. Moreover, verdicts on adultery cases also caused many controversies as the pun-
ishment consisted of either stoning to death or 100 lashes in public, while the punishment for 
cases of rape were not severe as it only included imprisonment. The Woman’s Action Forum 
(WAF) considered these court penalties as “brutal” and “degrading” as well as discriminatory, 
since most of the “female rape victims were doubly punished, but saw their violators go free” 
(Talbot, 1998).   
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The Downfall of Zia ul Haq  
 In 1980s, militant Shia, feminist and opposition parties became to the streets to demon-
strate against Zia’s Islamization policies and regulations. According to Jaffrelot (2000), “in 1981 
eleven parties came together to launch the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). 
There were few parties such as the Muslim League and Jamaat-i Islami that did not participate in 
this alliance as well as groups like the Pashtun and Baluchi separatists. Yet, the MRD became 
popular in Sind because Pakistan People’s Party was behind the organization of this movement 
and Bhutto, the founder of PPP martyred by Zia, became the symbol. In order to control the dis-
turbances produced by this movement, “three divisions of soldiers” were necessary and “in the 
course of three weeks of repression alone, the governor of Sind recorded 189 deaths and nearly 
2000 prisoners” (Jaffrelot, 2000). To secure his position in office and acquire popular legitimacy, 
Zia assured the country that elections will take place before March 1985 and also organized a 
“referendum asking Pakistanis whether they approved of his policy of Islamization and his con-
tinued wish to transfer power to the representatives of the people” (Jaffrelot, 2000). However, 
MRD boycotted the elections and also denounced the legislative elections announced about Zia. 
Nonetheless, electors were enthusiastic about the ballot. The National and regional assemblies 
for election of 1985 consisted mostly of property owners, representatives of business community 
and men that were financially capable of participating in elections without the support of politi-
cal party. During the first parliamentary session, Zia appointed himself as President of Pakistan 
and appointed a native of Sind Province, (a Sindi), Muhammad Khan Junejo, as the Prime Minis-
ter in hopes of weakening and breaking the MRD alliance. On December 1985, martial law was 
lifted and political parties resurfaced. Muslim League became the party of the government, in or-
der words, party of Junejo, while Benazir Bhutto returned from exile in 1986 and was arrested 
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for holding demonstrations for free elections. Apart from this, Zia dismissed Prime Minister 
Junejo in 1988 as the 8th amendment of the Constitution gave him the right to dismiss any gov-
ernment. Zia removed Junejo and “pronounced dissolution of the assembly” (Jaffrelot, 2000). 
Zia justified the dismissal of Prime Minister and dissolution of the assembly in terms of needing 
to control issues and troubles that emerged in Karachi that has fallen under the direct control to 
Mohajirs. Jaffrelot (2000), claims that this pretext was used again and again in years to come and 
that “authoritarian repression had reached its limit.”  In 1988, Zia and a US ambassador were 
killed in a plane crash, enabling the return to multiparty parliamentary democracy.  After Zia’s 
death, Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg, announced to withdraw military from pol-
















The 1980s and 1990s: Shifts in Power Between Civilian Government and Marital Law  
 After the death of Zia ul Haq in an aircraft crash in 1988, political parties once again 
came forward to participate in elections. During the 1988, the PPP, now led by a daughter of 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, became the first woman Prime Minister in Pakistan. Yet 
this victory of Benazir Bhutto was short - the late 1980s and 1990s in Pakistan is known as the 
era which experienced power shifts between elected leaders and military and vice versa. This in-
stability between politicians and the military, diminished the chances of democratic norms and 
institutions to take roots and nourish. Therefore, the political culture of Pakistan remained un-
suitable and alien to democratic practice. After the assassination of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia 
ul Haq’s takeover of the office, the chances for democracy decreased; however, the death of Zia 
raised hopes for economic growth, independent judiciary and free and fair politics, but these 
goals were not fulfilled. Being in politics for most part of Pakistani history, the military suprem-
acy upon elected civilian leaders was beyond the capacity of elected leaders to reduce or break. 
The military had become an institution that was politically, economically and socially strong, an 
operating state within a state. This chapter focuses on back and forth shift of power between 
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif during the 80’s and 90’s discussing ethnic, political and eco-
nomic challenges encountered by both.  
Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990)  
 Belonging to a charismatic family and due to the legacy of her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
Benazir Bhutto gained significant amount of support and sympathy from civilians. Being the 
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daughter of “a former Prime Minister who many had thought was hanged unjustly,”5in 1988, 
Benazir Bhutto became the first woman Prime Minister of a modern Muslim State. She was ad-
mired by many as the woman that refused to surrender to the autocratic rule of Zia, even after the 
cruel harassment and imprisonment during the early 1980s. Being elected the Prime Minister, the 
first challenge Benazir had to confront was the task of restoring democracy, which was “made 
extraordinarily daunting by the outgoing— and dead— dictator.” Under Zia, Pakistan trans-
formed from a government of parliamentary to presidential, focused on process of Islamization 
and embroiled into the Afghanistan crisis, which was exacerbating day by day. According to Tal-
bot (1998), the military had control over matters such “as Afghanistan, defense expenditure and 
service conditions, the Army exerted a veto on government policy.” Even though Benazir Bhutto 
became a Prime Minister, the PPP did poorly during the elections as it “failed to capture more 
than 92 out of 207 National Assembly seats” (Talbot, 1998).  Despite having received more seats 
in Punjab than the opposition party of Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI), a coalition of Nawaz 
Sharif and Junejo Muslim League along with eight other parties was created and the military ma-
nipulated the provincial elections in Punjab insuring more seats for IJI than PPP. This manipula-
tion allowed Nawaz Sharif to become the Chief Minister of Punjab.  
 According to Dawn, the lack of strong parliamentary base led to the undermining of 
Benazir’s government. Benazir Bhutto failed to dissolve the 8th Amendment, placed into prac-
tice by Zia which “empowered the president to first nominate the Prime Minister before she/he 
could be elected by the National Assembly.”6 As a result, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan did not 
consider her the Prime Minister until Benazir gave full control and authority over to the military 
                                                 
5 “Special Report: Daughter of the East 1988-1990/1993-1996” Dawn The Media Group Re-
trieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1366832 
6Ibid  
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in key areas such as Finance, Defense and Foreign Affairs, and Afghanistan. Lacking a strong 
parliamentary, Benazir’s political party PPP created an alliance with the Mohajir Qaumi Move-
ment (MQM) to maintain the stability of her government in Sindhi as well as the Awami Na-
tional Party(ANP) to “bag the Chief Minister’s post” in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Yet, PPP soon broke its alliance with both MQM and ANP 
as Benazir failed to maintain alliance and MQM was “seduced by Nawaz Sharif and its common 
benefactors.”  
The break of alliance between MQM and PPP led to violence in Hyderabad, marked by 
large-scale targeted shootings and bombings. In 1988, there was a massacre in which Sindhi Mo-
hajirs were targeted in Hyderabad. About two hundred civilians were killed during the targeting 
of Mohajir immigrant community. Even though it was not declared who carried out the acts, offi-
cials claimed that “unidentified gunmen sprayed bullets at crowd.”7Mohajir community blamed 
the Sindhi nationalists to have targeted and carried out attacks against their community while 
similar statements were made by the Sindhi community. As a response, the authorities sent in 
troops to enforce curfew in Hyderabad and in some parts of Karachi. In 1988, the PPP and MQM 
signed the Karachi Declaration which aimed to construct peace, love and rights in hopes to reu-
nite the rural and urban populations of Sindhi. Yet in 1989, target killings emerged in mohajir 
localities by masked gunmen in Karachi. While addressing a crowd in Karachi, MQM leader 
Altaf Hussain claimed that these attacks were as an attempt to spark riots “by elements who 
feared that MQM might unite all oppressed classes in the country and challenge their system of 
                                                 
7 “Ethnic Rioting in Karachi Kills 46 and Injuries 50” Retrieved from https://www.ny-
times.com/1988/10/02/world/ethnic-rioting-in-karachi-kills-46-and-injures-50.html 
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exploitation” (Talbot, 1998). The MQM joined the rival party of PPP, IJI “in condemning the de-
teriorating law and order situation in Karachi during an adjournment motion in the National As-
sembly” (Talbot, 1998).  In response to these attacks, Benazir Bhutto described the events in Sin-
dhi as “mini insurgency, and blamed the crisis on the legacy of the previous eleven years, declar-
ing; “the tree of martial law does not let anything grow in its shade. It will take some time for 
this situation to change” (Talbot, 1998).  
 In 1990, relations between the PPP and MQM became hostile, as the leader of latter 
party, Altaf Hussain was out of country for treat of kidney problems, when the Pucca Qila Inci-
dent took place in Hyderabad. During the incident, Sindhi police entered the Pucca Qila, a mo-
hajir locality in Hyderabad, to retrieve illegal weapons. In this raid, the Sindhi police opened fire, 
killing about forty people and wounding fifty. The MQM accused the Sindhi police for carrying 
out acts of discrimination and that women holding Quran over their heads were pleading the po-
lice to stop the massacre. Yet, the Sindhi police claimed that their actions were taken in defense 
as MQM supporters opened fire. According to Talbot (1998), “whatever the truth of the matter, 
the event and the wave of violence which followed in Karachi, including the Qayyum bus massa-
cre on 31 May, was cited by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan as part of his justification for the dis-
missal of the Bhutto government.”  
 Benazir Bhutto’s Removal by ‘Night Jackals’? 
 Since the elections in 1988, Benazir has faced challenges from President and the Chief of 
the Army Staff. By creating an alliance, the President and the Army Staff crippled Benazir from 
running an efficient government. Benazir had her hands tied on issues regarding Afghanistan, 
lack of power over policy of nuclear programs and most importantly, continuous plans by intelli-
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gent agencies to overthrow her government. For example, one such attempt was made on Octo-
ber 6, 1989, a meeting between ‘night jackals’8in Rawalpindi. This meeting consisted of leading 
ISI officers, Major Aamer and Brig. Imitate, opposition National Assembly and Sindhi PPP 
members. The surprising part about this meeting was not the discussions regarding the over 
throw of Benazir Bhutto’s government, but the fact that Benazir somehow was informed about 
this meeting and therefore “a trap was set to record the conspirators in the hope that Punjab Chief 
Minister Nawaz Sharif might himself be implicated.” However, Nawaz Sharif did not attend this 
meeting and ill relations between the government and the ISI emerged. It is important to mention 
that this secret meeting was held as a reaction to the removal of ISI head by Benazir’s govern-
ment, after the failed ISI backed the Afghan Mujahadin assault on Jalalabad, earlier that year.  
Furthermore, Benazir Bhutto also formed a committee that would investigate the intelligence 
agencies (Talbot, 1998). Rather than strengthening and establishing civilian control, Benazir 
Bhutto created enemies such as the President and the military through her actions. As a result, in 
addition to the instability in Sindh and the continuous blows from opposition party IJI, President 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan by using the powers given to him by the Eighth Amendment removed 
Benazir Bhutto out of office and dissolved the National Assembly as well as the Frontier and 
Sindh Provincial Assemblies. The President asserted that Benazir Bhutto’s removal was because 
of corruption, her being part of political ‘horse-trading’ and her inability to maintain law and or-
der.  According to Talbot (1998), Benazir Bhutto’s “demise owed far more to the fact that it had 
stepped on the Army’s toes than to the charges the President raised against it.” Even though the 
                                                 
8 Talbot, Ian. “Does the Army Shape Pakistan’s Foreign Policy?” pp 324-325. Retrieved from 
Christopher Jaffrelot (2002) “Pakistan Nationalism without a Nation?”  
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provincial assemblies were dissolved, the national and provincial elections were scheduled to be 
held as per according to the constitution.  
Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993)  
 After the dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a temporary caretaker Prime Min-
ister, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi came to office until elections took place.  During this time, Benazir 
Bhutto’s husband Asif Ali Zardari was arrested for the kidnapping of Murtaza Hussain Bukhari, 
while there were corruption cases still pending against Benazir Bhutto herself. The elections at 
this time did not reflect any intention for the institutionalization of democracy within Pakistan as 
politicians paid more attention as how to concentrate power, rather than find any solutions to is-
sues such as ethnicity and center province relations. After the removal from office, Benazir 
Bhutto made public statements insulting Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi by referring to 
him as “a clique of usurpers, thieves, thugs, robbers and looters” (Talbot, 1998). On November 
7, 1990, Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister, however similar challenges laid ahead of him 
as his predecessors. Known to have close relations with the Zia regime, Nawaz Sharif was 
charged with corruption, lack of effort made towards Islamization and failure to deal with crisis 
in Sindh. However, Nawaz Sharif made a lot of economic reforms as compared to the govern-
ance of Benazir Bhutto. According to I.A Rehman, the priorities of Nawaz Sharif were some-
what different from previous governments. Sharif was focused and prioritized “free enterprise, 
fulfillment of nuclear ambitions, and assertion of power in himself.”9Once in power, he an-
nounced the lifting of controls over foreign currency that entered the country to ensure foreign 
                                                 
9“Special Report: Going nuclear 1990-1993/1997-1999” Retrieved from 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1369428 
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investment. Moreover, other economic reforms made by Sharif included tax holidays for few in-
dividuals as well as privatization of nationalized and other units such as PIA and WAPDA which 
increased the popularity of the Prime Minister.  
 Nawaz Sharif also introduced “a number of populist measures to address poverty and so-
cial inequality” (Talbot, 1998). For example, he announced a fixed monthly minimum wage of 
Rs. 1,500 for unskilled workers in 1992 and in 1991 he “announced that 3.75 lakh acres of land 
in the Sukkur and Ghulam Muhammad Barrage areas of Sindh would be distributed to landless 
haris, each having 15 acres” (Talbot, 1998). In the year 1993, Nawaz Sharif also announced the 
“Yellow Taxi Scheme” which was an attempt to modernize taxi service within Pakistan and aid-
ing jobless youth with self-employment. About 40,000 households benefited from the loans that 
were promised to the unemployed for self-employment and with those loans 95,000 taxis, buses, 
coaches and trucks were sanctioned.10Soon after coming to power, Nawaz Sharif also revived the 
Islamization effort, first introduced by Zia ul Haq, by the introduction of Shariat Enforcement 
Act.  
 Although he was doing exceptionally well with economic reforms, the Prime Minister 
had become enemies with the President and the Chief of Army Staff.  Sharif disapproved the 
President’s appointment over the selection of a new army chief after the death of General Asif 
Nawaz Janjua and the retirement of General Baig (Jaffrelot, 2002). As a result, Nawaz Sharif 
tried to elude the President’s supervision by proposing a 12th Amendment in 1991. This Amend-
ment attempted to authorize the Prime Minister to take control of the administration of a prov-
ince. The IJI did not support Sharif as it feared President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and tensions 
                                                 
10Christopher, Jafflerot. A History of Pakistan and its Origins.  
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emerged between the President and Prime Minister as the latter failed to confirm whether he sup-
ported the reelection of the former. Like Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif also failed to address the 
mohajir issues in Karachi, giving the President and the military to develop control over civilian 
rule. In 1992, a government initiated military operation known as “Operation Clean Up” carried 
out in Karachi, after the split in the MQM party into MQM (Haqiqi) and MQM (Altaf). The aim 
of this operation was to crack down terrorist and criminals in Sindh. During this clean up, the 
military found “arms dumps and torture chambers for which they held the MQM responsible” 
(Jaffrelot, 2002).  The army discovered 17 torture cells which were run by MQM, “used to pun-
ish MQM dissidents and opponents… and that 60 people had been arrested since the internecine 
fighting erupted.”11 It is important to question from where did the MQM party get weapons 
from? Who financed the MQM party, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif or the military? An article in 
the Frontier Post dating back to July 8th 1992, by Ahmad Bashir claims that “Altaf Hussain and 
his MQM compatriots are not the only terrorists… but those who patronized and protected them 
are terrorists, Ghulam Ishaq Khan above all.” Bashir continues stating that Nawaz Sharif was 
also not unaware of the events taking place in Karachi but to secure his coalition government, he 
decided to look the other way. According to Bashir, Benazir Bhutto’s government tried to stop 
the MQM, however, she was forced to “withdraw registered cases against the MQM” and when 
she did not oblige her government was overthrown. Benazir Bhutto had tape recordings of the 
torture halls that were created by the MQM and these tapes were sent to President Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan, the Chief of Army and journalists which led to the Pucca Qila Incident.  Journalists have 
also claimed that Nawaz Sharif, when he was a chief minister of Punjab during Benazir’s regime, 
gave Hyderabad MQM about five crore (million) as a gift.  
                                                 
11 “17 MQM torture cells unearthed” Frontier Post, Tuesday June 23 1992 
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 In 1993, Nawaz Sharif was dismissed from the position of Prime Minister and National 
Assembly was dissolved by President Ishaq Khan. According to Jaffrelot (2002), Nawaz Sharif 
“appealed to the Supreme Court against the President’s decision… the judges ruled in his favor 
declaring the removal as unconstitutional.” Apart from this Nawaz Sharif also made an appeal to 
the High Court of Lahore for the restoration of the government of Punjab which was also ruled in 
his favor. However, this restoration of power was short lived as the “army corps commanders 
met urgently on 1 July to resolve the crisis— a sign that it was they who had the upper hand in 
political life” (Jaffrelot, 2002).  In 1993, both President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif were called upon to resign.  
The Return of Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996)  
 The elections of 1993, the daughter of the East returned back to power as Prime Minister 
stronger and powerful.  A setback for her during the elections was that she only won 86 seats out 
of 202 and therefore, once again she had to create alliance with the Muslim League that was led 
by Junejo and MQM.  Her position as Prime Minster became secure and efficient and when her 
party, PPP was able to elect one of their seniors, Farooq Lehar as President in 1993. Having 
Leghari as the President was fruitful for Benazir as he did as he was told. For example, Jaffrelot 
(2002) claims that President Leghari dismissed the NFWP government and substituted it with 
PPP. Having more power than before, one would believe that the transition towards democracy 
would be smooth, yet, political corruption and criminalization once again were at peak and the 
Prime Minister failed to address these issues. For example, Benazir’s husband Asif Ali Zardari 
was the minister of investments but is well known as ‘Mr. Ten Percent’ for the commission he 
pocketed. Apart from this, Benazir’s brother, Murtaza Bhutto, who returned from exile in Syria 
was also assassinated as he wanted to join politics against Benazir and her husband; who he 
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strongly disliked, with the support of their mother. Supporters of Murtaza Bhutto blame Zardari 
for the murder of his brother in law.  
 Jaffrelot (2002), claims that as the Afghanistan war approached, the rates of corruption 
and criminalization went to its peak. He asserts that under the protection of politicians “contra-
band in arms and opium often flourished” and in return the politicians asked for services from 
the gangs. These gangs became handy during election time at polling stations. Apart from this, 
Benazir’s second term also witnessed the rise of small Islamic groups of Sunni and Shia’s as 
there was a decline of Islamic parties in the electoral and also as response to Zia’s Islamization. 
Tahrik i Nifaz-i Shariah Muhammadi (TNSM), a Sunni group established in 1989, demanded for 
civil law to be replaced by Sharia. The movement by TNSM was subdued but led to forty deaths 
and secured the judicial powers of the mullahs in NWFP.  Conflicts between the Sunni and 
Shia’s took its peak in Jhang district as the Sunni’s were supported by Saudi Arabia and Shia’s 
by Iran as an attempt to create Islamic leadership on Pakistan soil. However, this movement was 
also suppressed as there was an attack on the Iranian Cultural Center in 1997.  
 Benazir’s second removal from Prime Minister office was not due to the interference by 
the military rather it was the alienation of President Legahari by Prime Minister. For example, in 
1994, Benazir Bhutto wanted to appoint eleven High Court judges which consisted of three 
women, whose nomination was not based on merit. The Supreme Court considered these nomi-
nations as illegal but Benazir ignored the Supreme Court order and carried on. In response to 
Benazir’s actions, “lawyers in Karachi and Lahore boycotted these ‘political judges’ and Presi-
dent Leghari sided with the Supreme Court decision (Jaffrelot, 2002). Apart from this incident, 
Jaffrelot (2002) claims that three other incidents created ill relations between the President and 
Prime Minister which consisted of 1) the purchase of luxurious villa in Surrey, 2) the murder of 
 46 
her brother, Murtaza Bhutto and 3) the attempts to buy votes in Punjab from deputies to place the 
government of her choice in place.  Henceforth, in 1996, President Leghari dismissed Prime 
Minister Bhutto and dissolved the National Assembly and this time the “Supreme Court ratified 
her dismissal.”  
The Second Term of Nawaz Sharif (1996-1999)  
 Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister for the second time in 1997 and gained back the 
support of the military. The military helped Sharif win the 1997 elections with a record of three-
fourth majority. Once in office, Sharif invested all his energies of resolving issues with India, es-
pecially conflict over Jammu and Kashmir. For example, in 1998, Sharif announced that he will 
sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) only if India decided to sign the deal. 
Early that year, India had tested five nuclear weapons, known as the Pohkran II operation and ra-
ther than testing its own nuclear weapons, Pakistan wanted to reach an agreement.  However, In-
dia decided not to sign the deal and Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon on May 28, 1998 and 
second one on May 30, 1998. Both India and Pakistan faced economic sanctions and condemna-
tion from the international community. This led the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan signed 
Lahore Declaration in 1999. The purpose of this declaration was to secure the national interests 
of both nations, which was the creation of an environment of peace and security. Furthermore, 
the prime ministers also agreed that “their governments shall intensify efforts to resolve all is-
sues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir”.12  Both governments also decided to refrain 
from interference and intervention in each other’s internal affairs. However, with the beginning 
                                                 
12 Naqvi, Jawed. Revisiting the Kargil Conflict. Dawn.  
Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/480266 (2009) 
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of war in Kargil, Kashmir; the agreement between both countries dissolved. In 1999, the rela-
tions between Sharif and the Army, Navy and Air Force deteriorated, as he was not informed of 
the plans to attack Kargil and the Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf made the deci-
sion to attack alone.  On October 1999, the relations between Sharif and the military worsened as 
he tried to remove the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Chief of Army Staff, General Musharraf. 
Furthermore, Sharif also denied the landing of General Musharraf’s plane as he suspected a mili-
tary coup, but the Army dismissed Sharif from power on the orders of Musharraf and securely 
landed his plane in Karachi. Sharif was placed under house arrest by the military and was tried in 
Antiterrorism Court for crimes such as kidnapping, attempted murder, hijacking, terrorism and 
corruption. The Court passed the verdict of life sentence to Sharif, but with an agreement with 
Saudi Arabia, the military exiled Sharif from the country for the next 10 years. The political 
power once again shifted to the military, which ruled Pakistan for ten years.  
 This chapter presents the history of political, economic and social affairs in Pakistan un-
der the governments of elected civilian leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Both of these 
leaders served as prime ministers of Pakistan for two terms, however, both were ousted from of-
fice because they threatened the military interests. Once in power, Bhutto tried to reduce the 
power of military by attempting to make changes to the Constitution. Yet, the military supported 
her opposition party leader, Nawaz Sharif to become the prime minister and removed Bhutto 
from power. With the support of military, relations between Sharif and military became stable, 
but with economic and political reforms Sharif was aiming to bring, the military and the “Estab-
lishment” considered its interests under threat. For example, peace talks with India over Kashmir 
would have reduced the importance of military within society and therefore, it can be stated that 
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to stay powerful and relevant the military attacked Kargil. If relations with India had become sta-
bilized, then threat to national security would disappear, making the military weak and most im-
portantly stop foreign financial aid. To stay relevant in political affairs and powerful, external 






















Military Rule Ends, Democracy Emerges?  
 In 1999, Nawaz Sharif’s second run as the Prime Minister came to an end through a 
bloodless coup. Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf came to power and 
became the President of Pakistan. His rule started in 1999 and ended in 2008. Almost ten years 
of military rule made it very difficult for Pakistan to develop the political and economic environ-
ment that enables democracy to take roots within a country. Apart from that, the international re-
lations that Pakistan developed with the United States, during the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, in-
creased the military’s power and role like never before within Pakistan. As discussed in the pre-
ceding chapter on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, factors such as struggle 
to diminish military power, lack of ability to create political and economic stability as well as in-
ternational interference, allowed the military to legitimize their existence not only in politics but 
also in the decision-making process. This chapter discusses the years from 1999 to 2017; focus-
ing on the military leadership of General Pervez Musharraf and the democratic rule of President 
Asif Ali Zardari and lastly the third term of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister. This chapter will 
also focus on discussing how the military has adopted a new way of using their power to influ-
ence politics behind the curtains.  
Pervez Musharraf: The Rise and the Fall  
 Pervez Musharraf’s military rule from 1999-2008 can be described as a “brand of life-
style-liberalism mixed with a different brand of dictatorial politics.” 13 It was also “unfashiona-
                                                 
13“Special Report: The military strikes back 1999-2008.” Dawn. 
  Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1372376 
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ble” and looked down upon by other states in the international arena, as the era of military inter-
ventions had come to an end, putting Musharraf’s position into trouble. The United States also 
placed automatic coup related sanctions on Pakistan under the “section 508 of the annual foreign 
assistance appropriations act.” Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf did not declare a martial law 
after dismissing the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Musharraf chose the title of 
Chief Executive instead of being a martial law administrator. As a Chief Executive, Musharraf 
had a considerable amount of support from westernized elites, radical groups of civil society and 
NGOs as well as from new Prime Minister M.Z. Jamali who was elected in an election controlled 
by military. All these factors enabled Musharraf to create a government consisting of a carefully 
selected political elite and a group of bureaucrats and technocrats. Since the judiciary has the his-
tory of endorsing and working with military rules, the higher judiciary gave Musharraf “three 
years after his coup to hold elections.” In 2002, Musharraf fulfilled the promise and held elec-
tions by which “pro-military alliance won a plurality of seats, while a coalition of Islamist parties 
made a surprisingly strong showing.” As a response to the elections, 18 of Pakistan’s political 
parties formed an Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) but Musharraf was able to neu-
tralize the effectiveness of this alliance through court’s verdict in his favor. In the same year, 
Pervez Musharraf also made changes to the Constitution to strength his position by announcing 
himself the Chief of Army and the President of Pakistan simultaneously. In 2003, Musharraf cre-
ated an agreement with Islamic opposition parties, bringing the constitutional changes in front of 
the Parliament and assuring that Musharraf will resign from his military rank or position in 2005. 
In 2004, the government created the National Security Council (NSC) that legitimized the mili-
tary’s role and enabled it to supervise the civilian cabinet. The aim of this Council was to institu-
tionalize the governance role of the army. Apart from this change, Musharraf also bend the rules 
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and bring his close ally, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, to the position of Prime Minister. This 
particular action marginalized opposition parties and signaled that Musharraf is not complied to 
follow the rules as agreed upon.   
The 9/11 Attacks and Musharraf’s Secure Dominance  
 Like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought profits for the Zia ul Haq administration, 
the 9/11 attacks in 2001, saved the Musharraf administration from the downfall in the era of un-
wanted coup. When Musharraf came to power, the United States placed a sanction that stopped 
its financial assistance to Pakistan; however, after 9/11 the United States considered Pakistan as 
a vital ally in the international anti-terrorism coalition and maintained that “Musharraf’s govern-
ment is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” 14 Moreover, the Congress re-
moved restrictions and allowed large scale United States financial aid to Pakistan. According to 
the 9/11 Commission Report, “the Bush Administration also refrained from expressing any 
strong public criticisms of Pakistan’s internal practices,” yet argued that it is necessary to 
strengthen civilian political institutions. Due to this alliance with the United States, Musharraf 
became a powerful leader whose military dictatorship was legitimized because of the “continu-
ous waivers of coup related aid restrictions,” hindering the process of democratization in Paki-
stan. Even if the democratic political institutions were strengthened, Pakistan’s political parties 
and civil society became destabilized and weak as military influence became profound. Accord-
ing to Pakistani Political Analyst Najam Sethi, “Musharraf’s major policy shifts after 9/11 have 
come through compulsion by external pressure or events and that, while the direction of Paki-
stan’s policy change has been appropriate, the momentum of change is too slow and awkward 
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and unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible mass.”15 This support from the United States, 
made Musharraf powerful, but he was a marginal satisfier” that did only minimum of what was 
expected of him. Therefore, many political analysts and corresponds claimed that it is essential 
that the “country’s secular political parties”16 be allowed to emerge and function into the system 
so that the country can become stabilized and endure democracy. Similar to the Zia ul Haq era, 
foreign aid from Western country’s legitimized military rule and diminished the chances of dem-
ocratic institutions to take root in Pakistan. Despite the fact, that the United States claims that it 
will help restore democratic institutions so that Pakistan can thrive economically and become a 
moderate Muslim State, by negotiating with the military. However, I argue that United States fi-
nancial assistance enables it to monitor political developments by using the military as its imple-
mentor and as a result “Pakistan’s fragile democratic institutions continuously remain under 
threat from the authoritarian influences of the country’s powerful military and quasi-feudal eco-
nomic structures.”   
Lack of Social Reforms Under Musharraf  
 Unlike the preceding military coups, Musharraf faced challenges from ethnic groups 
within Pakistan. In 2005, there was an increased unrest between the military and tribal groups of 
Baluchistan due to the rape of women by the army in the regions. The Baluchistan Liberation 
Army (BLA) attacked various infrastructures, projects and staffs and the local tribal leaders de-
manded for political autonomy as well as control over the regions natural resources. However, 
                                                 
15 Sethi, Najam. “Happy Birthday Pakistan,” Friday Times (Lahore), 2004. 
16 Sehti. Najam. “What the Country Needs” Friday Times (Lahore), 2003. 
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Musharraf objected to the political autonomy of Baluchi people and engaged in a counter-insur-
gency paramilitary operation leading to an increase in human rights violations and humanitarian 
crisis.   
 In addition to tension with tribal groups, Musharraf also started to lose the support of 
NGOs, trade unions and human rights activists. Women and minority groups lacked equality 
within the political system and women had difficulty of voting as well as not being granted to 
run for office due to oppression from social and religious conservatives. The tide of shift towards 
democracy in the international realm took its toll in Pakistan, as small institutions started to ad-
dress numerous human rights violations such as “forced disappearances,” torture and discrimina-
tion against women and religious minorities. NGOs were allowed to publish critical material and 
trade unions were allowed to exist but not to engage in strikes or collective bargaining. As the 
international politics changed so did domestic politics within Pakistan that posed a threat to 
Musharraf’s rule which led to his dismissal in 2008. Apart from human rights violations of 
NGOs and activists, the military placed censorships on most material published by the media. If 
the media broadcasted anything that questioned the authority of armed forces, then the media 
outlets and journalists were harassed by the military officials, suppressed by blasphemy law or 
shutdown. In 2002, foreign press corps were attacked by angry mob and Indian journalists were 
not granted visas. In the same year, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and 
murdered by Islamic fundamentalists. Apart from Islamic fundamentalists, journalists suffered 
from physical attacks from hired thugs and police. In 2003, Shaheen Sehbai, an editor, was pres-
sured to resign because he published an article against the intelligence agencies.  In 2005, jour-
nalists lacked the ability to report the crisis taking place in the tribal areas near the Afghanistan 
borders as the vehicles of reporters were fired upon killing two and injuring two journalists. The 
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continuous tribal area troubles, human rights violations and the lack of freedom of press de-
creased the support for Musharraf’s regime. I argue that these events encouraged these groups to 
create an alliance that became essential during the Lawyers Movement that brought an end to 
Musharraf’s military coup in 2008.  
The Lawyers Movement, Ending Musharraf’s Coup  
 In 2005, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was sworn into office under the Musharraf Pro-
visional Council Order. While in office, Chaudhry worked to expand the role of Pakistan’s judi-
ciary and addressed cases regarding public interest and cases requesting to check government 
power and authority. In 2006, the Chief Justice subpoenaed representatives of Inter-Services In-
telligence Agency for connections to the global war on terror. Musharraf took these reforms as a 
challenge to his authority and therefore, suspended the Chief Justice due to his growing support 
for his reforms and placed the Chief Justice under house arrest as Chaudhry refused to resign. 
The continuing media coverage of Chief Justices dismissal and house arrest; in major cities law-
yers engaged in protests while Supreme Court judges publicly supported the Chief Justice. When 
the media showed the Chief Justice being “dragged by his hair from a police man”17, public sup-
port came from the provinces of Punjab and Sindh as well as professionals, students, NGOs and 
other civil society groups turning it into a mass movement. In 2007, Musharraf announced a mar-
tial law, suspended the Constitution and parliament. The judges faced suspension as they refused 
to take the new oath and the media outlets were taken off air as they refused to stop the broad-
casting stories of the protest. The public that engaged in protests, were beaten and arrested. As 
the domestic and international pressure increased, Musharraf resigned in the summer of 2008.  
                                                 




The Democratic Governance of Asif Ali Zardari  
 In 2008, the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf came to an end, paving the 
way for free and fair elections that brought President Asif Ali Zardari to office. However, in the 
struggle for the balance of power post Musharraf era; the actions of elected political officials 
have backfired, which prove that if not directly, then indirectly the military still runs the show. 
For example, in his first six months in office, President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister 
Yousaf Raza Gillani pushed to reduce the power of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency of 
Pakistan which has been involved in politics for many years. Zardari pushed to “bring the ISI un-
der the supervision of the Interior Ministry,” 18 yet they backtracked in doing so. It must have 
been seen by the military as an attempt to curtail their power. Instead the army General Ashfaq 
Kayani, ex ISI head, claimed that he supports the civilian led democracy, but rejected Zardari’s 
decision of giving control of ISI to Interior Ministry. General Kayani argued that “the military 
should be allowed to run its own affairs without the interference of the civilian government” and 
replaced the ISI director general with his associate, Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha. This 
decision of making Pasha the director created tensions between President Zardari and the mili-
tary. In the aftermaths of the 2008 Mumbai attacks which killed 173 people; Zardari was incapa-
ble of convincing Pasha to work with investigators in New Delhi. This lack of ability to shift 
power away from the military and ISI shows that establishing control over the military is diffi-
cult, as the interests of the military become threatened and therefore the military takes any meas-
ure to keep its interests secured. The Zardari government pushed continuously, to establish moni-
toring and check over military Establishment. For example, the “Memogate” Scandal of 2011, 
                                                 
18 “ISI political wing disbanded: FM Quershi.” Dawn.  
Retrieved from  https://www.dawn.com/news/956938  
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challenged the governance of Zardari as the military accused him of delivering a memo through 
the Pakistani Ambassador Hussain Haqqani to United States Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff 
Admiral Mullen. The memo delivered by Haqqani to Mullen presented the fears of a military 
coup post the killing of Osama bin Laden. According to the memo, Zardari claimed that “the Pa-
kistan army being unable to bear the humiliation of the Bin Laden raid carried out by the Ameri-
can forces, can lead to military coup” and therefore, the assistance of Obama Administration was 
needed to end Chief of Staff General Kayani’s and ISI Chief General Pasha’s “brinkmanship 
aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus.” 19The memo promised to punish political offi-
cials that were responsible for harboring Osama bin Laden as well as gave the Unit- ed States the 
permission to carry out operations to capture and kill al Qaeda and Taliban officials.  
 According to Jafftrelot (2015), the memo was supposed to remain a secret, but Mansoor 
Ijaz an intermediary of Haqqani published the memo in the Financial Times in 2011. The mili-
tary accused Haqqani, a close ally of Zardari, of drafting the memo and urging Ijaz to present it 
to Mullen. Haqqani and Zardari both deny involvement in the drafting of the memo and political 
analysts claim that it is a conspiracy against them by the military. Dawn, newspapers political 
commentator, Cyril Almedia, asserted that “the boys (the army establishment) are up to their 
tricks again.” 20 The memo case was taken to the Supreme Court which led to the Haqqani’s res-
ignation and exile to the United States as he claimed his life is under threat and that he does not 
want to go back to Pakistan to encounter a mob. In addition, President Zardari’s power also 
                                                 
19 Rogin, Josh. Exclusive: Secret Pakistani-U.S. Memo Offering Overthrow of Military Leader-
ship Revealed.” (2011). Retrieved from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/17/exclusive-secret-
pakistani-u-s-memo-offering-overthrow-of-military-leadership-revealed/ 
20 “Memogate’ Scandal Reveals Civil-Military Splits. Dawn. Retrieved from : 
https://www.dawn.com/news/674146 
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weakened as corruption charges emerged against him; allowing the military to continuously 
practice its control over economic and foreign policy and indirectly political affairs.  
The Return of Nawaz Sharif  
 In 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to power after free and fair elections that 
were conducted nationwide. Nawaz Sharif came to office with a plan to create good relations 
with neighboring rival country India, ensure economic growth and to stabilize democracy within 
Pakistan. As a step towards good relations with India, Sharif went to the swearing-in ceremony 
of Prime Minister Modi and in 2014 engaged in talks regarding the control over terrorism and 
“resume the stalled peace process.” Dawn newspaper notes that there was growth in trade be- 
tween the two countries since the peace talks and it was predicted that in 2015 it will touch the 
$5billion dollar mark. However, in 2014 the decision by Nawaz Sharif “to put General Mushar-
raf, a prior military dictator, on trial for suspending the constitution” 21led to tensions between 
the civil-military relations. Just few days after Sharif’s decision to trail Musharraf; opposition 
party leader Imran Khan took to the streets claiming that the elections that brought Sharif to of-
fice were rigged. These staged protests delayed the scheduled visits by China’s leader regarding 
China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project and weakened the government urging Na-
waz Sharif to depend on the army chief “to stave off the threat of a coup.” 22 The military was 
not willing to allow their former general to be humiliated by Sharif’s government; yet the sup-
port for Sharif’s decision gained a lot of support from parliament and opposition parties also 
stood by Sharif which had negative effect on civil-military relations.  
                                                 
21 Hussain, Zahid.The Unmaking of Nawaz Sharif. Dawn. (2017) Retrieved from: 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1349557  
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 Despite the successful peace talks between India and Pakistan in 2014, the year of 2015 
once again witnessed the rivalry between these two countries. Political analysts argue that for 
years the military has been justifying its control over foreign and national policy by claiming that 
India is still an enemy and these peace talks between Sharif-Modi were challenging the interests 
of the military. As a result, attacks were initiated by the Pakistan military on Indian army bases 
in Kashmir causing tensions between the two countries. In response to these attacks, India’s 
Prime Minister Modi decided not to take part in the 19th SAARC summit hosted by Pakistan in 
Islamabad. Furthermore, Prime Minister Modi also avoided engaging in talks with Prime Minis-
ter Sharif regarding Kashmir Issue. In addition, these attacks on Indian army bases also led to a 
showdown between India and Pakistan at the United Nations General Assembly over Kashmir in 
2016. Pakistan argued that it still wants to build peace with India, but “it is not possible by re-
solving the Kashmir issue.” 23On the other hand, India accused Pakistan of being a terrorist state 
and for “nurturing, peddling and exporting terrorism.” India’s Foreign Minister Sawraj claimed 
that all of allegations made by Sharif regarding human rights violations in Kashmir are baseless 
and Jammu and Kashmir will remain a part of India.  
 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif changed the Chief of Army three times, but each time “he 
picked dark horse for the coveted post, hoping to tilt the balance of power towards his civilian 
government.” In 2017, Sharif was ousted from office after being charged of corruption that was 
accused against him by the Panama Papers scandal that claimed Sharif to have offshore busi-
nesses and capital under his children name. Sharif was not ousted by the military, but by the Su-
preme Court, which claimed Sharif to be a dishonest leader. Yet, political analysts also assert 
                                                 
23 “India Pulls Out of Pakistan-hosted 19th Saarc Summit. Dawn. Retrieved from: 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1286460  
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that even though military did not have a direct interference; senior and middle rankers in the mil-
itary intelligence agencies were feeding the media with anti-Sharif material. The Panama Papers 
scandal is important because it unfolded during the unresolved major problems between the 
civil-military. Most importantly, the joint investigation team (JIT) investigating the case against 
Sharif consisted mostly of members of ISI and Military Intelligence(MI). It can be argued from 
these events that the military used to the scandal to destabilize the government in the sense of 




















 This research aimed to address why the Pakistani military intervenes into political affairs. 
In order to do so, the method of process tracing was used which allowed to focus on the political, 
economic and social factors that enabled the military to engage into politics from 1947 till pre-
sent. The research attempted to test the statements of S.E Finer and Harold Trinkunas that due to 
lack of political culture (political institutions) within the country can enable the military to en-
gage into politics and become the most powerful institution. This research also addresses 
Ghoshal’s statement of “power without responsibility and accountability” which claims that the 
military’s pattern of involvement into political affairs has changed. In simple words, rather than 
openly and directly conducting military interventions like in the past; the military indirect influ-
ences political decisions within Pakistan through institutions such as NAB, ISI and etc.   
 After partition from India, Pakistan, being a newly independent state, had weak leader-
ship, lacked blueprints for democratic state and was constantly insecure about its national secu-
rity from India and Afghanistan. These factors weakened the position of politicians within Paki-
stan as the military became politically and economically dominate. As chapter 1 discusses the 
constant use of military for political developments and dispute settlement enabled the military to 
develop the understanding and skill of politics, a field that is non-professional to them. Once in 
power, chapter 1 and chapter 3 discuss Ayub Khan’s and Zia Ul Haq’s political and economic 
changes in Pakistan. These military leaders not only eliminated and rejected democratic system 
of governance, but also made changes to the Constitution to ensure the military supremacy by 
consuming the powers of legislative, executive and judiciary, for their present and the future. 
Both Khan and Haq were able to bring economic development into Pakistan, however, it is 
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proven that these developments were for short period of time and this economic stability did not 
help in building effective political institutions. Instead the military, became a dominant institu-
tion and figure because of the financial support from the national budget as well as foreign.  Pa-
kistan did witness a brief period of rule by democratically elected leaders such as Benazir Bhutto 
and Nawaz Sharif, as discussed in chapter 2 and 4. However, these political leaders not only 
failed to diminish the influence of military into political affairs but also failed to work towards 
strengthening democratic roots within Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did successfully reduce the 
power of military and made an attempt to reunite political leaders from different Islamic coun-
tries to become a powerful entity within South East Asia. Yet, the opening of murder cases and 
protests by opposition parties enabled the continuous use of military to suppress these internal 
disputes. In addition, the disapproval of United States to the commitments made by Islamic 
countries leadership during the Lahore Summit also threatened not just the interests of United 
States but also Israel. As a result, the United States also indirectly gave the approval to remove 
these political leaders that were present at the Summit through the use of military.  
 Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif also failed to strengthen democratic norms and values 
in Pakistan and instead used all their energies to diminish the powers of military, resulting in the 
exile of both leaders. The year 1990-1998 Pakistan witnessed the back and forth political power 
change between Bhutto and Sharif, which one can argue was enough to build democratic politi-
cal institutions. Yet, these leaders used their power of political office and the military to debase 
opposition political leaders. As a result, chapter 5 discusses the return of military in 1998.  In 
1998, General Perverz Musharraf came to power and announced military coup. Musharraf an-
nounced military coup at the time when it was considered “unfashionable” and did not have for-
eign financial support like previous military leaders. But the events of 9/11 made the Pakistani 
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military and presence of Musharraf in politics an asset. However, the open attack on supreme 
court judge and suspension of Constitution in 2007, reduced public support of Musharraf in Paki-
stan. The Lawyers Movement of 2007, ensured the removal of Musharraf and power transitioned 
to democratically elected leader Asif Ali Zardari in 2008. It can be argued that despite emer-
gence of stable and effectively operating political institutions within Pakistan; the questioning of 
military actions creates troubles for the elected leaders. If not directly, the military indirectly di-
minished the power and influence of elected leaders by supporting opposition leaders and their 
protests. The military helped opposition parties open the Memogate Scandal against Zardari, 
while removed Sharif on the bases of Panama Papers.  
 The indirect influence of military in politics is as dangerous as its direct involvement. 
This indirect overshadow of politics disables the leadership from operating and performing polit-
ical duties, hindering the process of political and economic development. Despite having a tran-
sition towards democracy, it is evident that the norms and values of this system have not fully 
been nourished and they will not if the military has indirect influence. Political journalists and 
analysts in Pakistan have argued that in order for democracy to survive, tensions between civil-
ian government and the military have to be reduced either by working together on national secu-
rity and political issues or working independently without interfering into each other’s realm. 
Yet, military independence can be costly as it enables “military professionalism” resulting into 
direct military interventions. Political leaders and military can work together, but these agencies 
require accountability of each other which leads to tensions. Therefore, I argue that political 
leaderships resist from engaging into issues and matters that diminish or question the status of 
the military. A country like Pakistan that has had continuous military interventions and coups 
throughout its history, should resist challenging the authority of the military. Instead, political 
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leadership should invest all energies into strengthening political institutions that ensure democ-
racy and enforce economic development. With such development and advancement, changes in 
society will occur, naturally shifting the power paradigms within the country. Taking Zardari and 
Sharif leadership into consideration; the leaders challenged the military decisions and actions 
threatening military interests. Therefore, the military indirectly created tensions during their 
terms in office by supporting opposition parties. It was essential for these leaders to invest their 
attention to matters of strengthening institutions that could have helped in reducing military 
dominance, rather than challenging it. As a result, countries that have had military interventions 
or coups should understand that military is a powerful institution and only with the gradual polit-
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